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Abstract  
 This study uses an event study framework to find the relationship between ownership 
concentration and project value. I find that project value first increases with ownership 
concentration when block size, the percentage ownership of the largest blockholder, is smaller 
than 10%, then declines with ownership concentration when block size gets larger, and finally 
rises again when block size exceeds 30%. However, my research only suggests an ambiguous 
relationship between ownership concentration and firm value.  Additionally, ownership 
concentration seems to affect both the timing of market responses and the market’s interpretation 
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I Introduction 
 
The effects of blockholder and block ownership on firm value have been fiercely debated 
in the past several decades, and researchers have yet to reach a definite conclusion. On the one 
hand, block holding encourages superior management or outside monitoring of the firm as the 
blockholder themselves or their representative usually either serve on the management team 
directly or sit on the board of directors. The “agency problem”, or the conflict of interests 
between management and shareholders can be thus alleviated through concentrated ownership of 
stocks. (Jensen and Meckling 1976) In other words, as the stake of a stockholder increases, he 
will face greater incentives to increase the firm’s value, either by directly influencing corporate 
decisions or by better monitoring corporate policies. Ownership Concentration thereby aligns the 
interest of management with the interest of shareholders. On the other hand, high levels of block 
ownership can lead to managerial entrenchment, which occurs when the blockholder gains so 
much voting right that he becomes the dictator of the company himself, and he could make poor 
corporate decisions that maximizes his own utility but harms the remaining minority 
shareholders. Blockholders can thus be turned into “empire-builders” when they are powerful 
enough.  
Morck, Shleifer and Vishny (1988) found that Tobin’s Q (which they think is a good 
measure of firm value) increases when block ownership is lower than 5 percent and decreases 
when block ownership is between 5 percent to 25 percent using the CDE dataset which is 
composed of 371 fortune 500 firms in 1980. In other words, the value effect of increase in block 
size is positive when block size is small, and negative when it gets larger. The authors’ 
interpretation is that at low level of block holdings, increases in block ownership helps with 
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solving the “Agency Problem”; at high level of block holdings, however, further increases in 
block ownership raises investors’ suspicion on its intention. McConnell and Servaes (1990) also 
found similar, if not completely identical, results to Morck, Shleifer and Vishny’s using the 
Value Line dataset – ownership concentration is initially positively correlated with firm value 
but gradually becomes negative when the ownership gets concentrated enough.  
However, the argument that “concentrated ownership creates firm value” is hard to prove, 
even given the strong correlation between block ownership and firm value. First, there could be 
an unobserved heterogeneity problem. As argued in Holderness (2003), firms of high block 
holding and low block holding could be fundamentally different in some other unobserved 
characteristics. For example, block size is endogenous to stock liquidity in a model proposed by 
Edmans (2009). It could well be the case that the optimal block size increases when the firm 
becomes more liquid, meanwhile investors also favor liquidity; thus, more liquid firms will have 
both more concentrated ownerships and higher firm values. Cross-sectional regressions might 
suggest block size as a driving factor in firm value, but in reality it is the increase in liquidity 
measures of the stock, not block size of the firm that causes the upsurge in the firm value.  
This paper takes a new approach in understanding how concentrated ownership can affect 
firm value using an event study framework. I look at the relationship between cumulative 
abnormal returns (change in firm value) and concentration of ownership around the 
announcement of new investment projects. If the relationship Morck, Shleifer and Vishny found 
between block size and firm value is accurate, then we should expect to see a positive correlation 
between ownership concentration and CARs when block holding is relatively low, and negative 
correlation when block holding gets larger. This is because concentrated ownership can alleviate 
the agency problem only when the ownership is not too concentrated. The market’s differential 
	   6	  
responses to firms’ investment projects reflect investors’ diverse profitability expectations for 
them. In the first step of answering the question “how concentrated ownership can affect firm 
value”, I aim at explaining how concentrated ownership can affect project value, as the stock 
price movement around the project announcement day provides an unbiased assessment of the 
NPV (net present value) of the project. If we regard corporations as conglomerates of investment 
projects, then higher project value should be a fairly strong indicator for higher firm value.  
Using panel data can partially solve this “unobserved heterogeneity” problem, as the 
change in a firm’s block size over time could be exogenous. For example, when firm A acquires 
firm B, which is identical to firm A except that firm B don’t have any blockholders, the block 
size of new firm will decrease without any other firm characteristics changing.  Himmelberg, 
Hubbard, and Palia (1999) used 600 randomly selected firms as their sample and they found that 
change in managerial ownership affect neither firm value nor firm performance over the 1982 -
1992 period. 
Many other economists have also found results somehow contradictory to Morck, 
Shleifer and Vishny’s using cross-sectional data. Demsetz and Lehn (1985) and Holderness and 
Sheehan (1988) find no significant correlation between the accounting rate of return (return on 
equity) and the concentration of ownership. These findings seem to suggest that either there is no 
relationship between block-holding and firm performance or “the optimal ownership level varies 
by firm, and firms are at their optimal level”, as Demsetz or Lehn put it. What Lehn and Demsetz 
are implying is: block size itself is endogenous, and profit-maximizing firms will choose an 
optimal level of block size depending on its industry, size and instability of profit rate.  
The reverse-causation problem also arises when arguing that concentrated ownership 
induces higher firm using the positive correlation between the two that Morck, Shleifer and 
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Vishny found. Blockholders might favor firms with a high Tobin’s Q. Indeed, who doesn’t want 
to sit on the board of directors of Google or Amazon?  
The event study framework is complementary to cross-sectional model proposed by 
Morck, Shleifer and Vishny (1988) and the panel model proposed by Himmelberg, Hubbard, and 
Palia (1999), because 1. It is completely free of reverse-causation problem: lagged block size is 
exogenous to CARs around investment project announcements 2. Theory leads to clearer 
predictions about the differential CARs to low and high block holdings 3. More careful controls 
are incorporated into the model to insure that correlation is not biased by any omitted variables.  
The paper proceeds as follows. In section II, I present the formation of the dataset and 
summary statistics. In section III, I show the timing difference of CARs between high block 
holding firms and low block holding firms in the advent of investment project announcements 
due to their differential incentive to trade on information prior to the news going public. In 
section IV, I show the differential effect of investment shock to CAR with the respect to block 
sizes, and use it to explain why investment shock is negatively correlated with project value. 
Investors generally cast doubt on the profitability of investment projects when the amount of 
investment increases; however, having large blockholders seem to have alleviated this effect. 
Finally, I show the piecewise liner relationship between block size and project value. I 
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II Dataset Formation and Summary Statistics  
 
 The bedrock of my dataset is the Blockholder dataset constructed by Henrik Cronqvist 
and Rüdiger Fahlenbrach. It contained standardized data for blockholders of 1,913 publically 
traded companies from 1996 to 2001. I extracted company name, ticker, year, percentage held by 
each blockholder from the already established dataset, and formed my own blockholder data 
containing information about the percentage holding of the largest blockholder (which I define as 
the “max block size” of the firm) and the total percentage holding of all blockholders (which I 
define as the “total block size” of the firm) for each corresponding firm-year. My final version of 
blockholder dataset contains max block size and total block size information for 7,650 firm-years 
and 1,913 firms over the 6-year period from 1996 to 2001. Note that due to either bankruptcy or 
merger and acquisitions of the firms in the dataset, some years for certain firms might be 
missing.  
 The News dataset containing information of each investment project announcement is 
constructed by using a web crawler1. The computer program will search for investment projects 
announcements made by firms in the blockholder dataset from 1997 to 2002 in the Proquest 
archives for The Wall Street Journal, The Washington Post, and The New York Times. The 
crawler craws through the headlines of the three newspapers listed above, and searches for the 
ones that contains: “company name” + “billion OR million” + “spend OR invest OR propose OR 
announce OR plan” + “project OR research OR technology OR plant OR facility OR store OR 
factory OR expand OR development OR upgrade OR increasing customer demand OR pipeline 
OR equipment OR assembly line”. Company name is list of strings that contains the simplified 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 The detailed program can be found in Appendix A 
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names of the companies in the block holder dataset. For example, “Zurn Industries INC” in the 
blockholder dataset will be simplified to “Zurn”. An example of a headline for a successful 
search: “SAFEWAY plans $2 Billion Investment to add 100 stores and remodel 400: [final 
Edition]”. The news dataset contains the headline of the news, company name, ticker as in the 
blockholder dataset, investment amount, currency, and the date of the news. An initial search 
resulted in 1382 data entries. After eliminating the false positives by manually picking out the 
irrelevant news, 315 data entries with actual investment project announcements are left. I, then, 
consolidated the data entries that reported the same news, for example: when both the Wall 
Street Journal and the New York Times reported that IBM had planned $300 million plant in 
China, I only kept the one with the earlier announcement date. When two companies announced 
a joint venture project, half of the announced amount was attributed to each of the company.  
Then, I converted all investments in foreign currencies to US Dollar by using the exchange rate 
on that specific date. The Final News dataset contains the announcements of 208 unique 
investment projects, worth of  $191 Billion Dollars, or on average $936 Million per project.  
 Other balance sheet-related information was acquired from the COMPUSTAT dataset. 
For each firm in the blockholder dataset, I recorded its COMPUSTAT ticker, total asset, current 
asset, Capital Expenditure (or CAPEX), Research & Development, total liability, current liability, 
and 4-digit SIC code, every year from 1996 to 2001. The SIC code was then used to generate 8 
industry dummy variables: “SERVICES”, “FINANCE”, “WHOLESALE”, “RETAIL”, 
“Transportation”, “Communication, Electric, Gas and Sanitary Service” (which I called TCEGS), 
“CONSTRUCTION”, “MANUFACTURING” and “MINING”. The final COMPUSTAT dataset 
is of the same size as the blockholder dataset. The balance-sheet blockholder data are lagged one 
year to the investment news to avoid the reverse-causation problem.  
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Stock returns, trading volumes and shares outstanding for firms from 520 trading days 
prior to its investment project news to 20 days after the news was acquired using the CRSP daily 
stock files. I used the [-520, -21] as the 500-day sampling window to calculate the CAPM-alphas 
and CAPM-betas of firms for each event by regressing individual stock return on the market 
return, the long-term volatility by calculating the standard deviation of stock returns, and the 
average turnover ratio by dividing the daily trading volumes by total shares outstanding. Note 
that I intentionally allow the betas and alphas to be different for same firms, because I think the 
amount of systematic risk firms carry could change over time. Then I used the alphas and betas 
to construct the abnormal returns for each days in the event window [-11,  +11], and calculated 
the pre-announcement drift, or the cumulative abnormal return from 11 days prior to the 
announcement day to 2 days prior to the announcement day (later I called it CAR [-11, -2]), the 
event return, or the cumulative abnormal return from 1 day prior to the announcement day to 1 
day after the announcement day (CAR [-1, +1], and the post-announcement drift, or the 
cumulative abnormal return from 2days after the announcement day to 11 days after the 
announcement day. The final CRSP dataset contains the CAR [-11, -2], CAR [-1, +1], CAR [+2, 
+11], PERMNO, trading volumes on the event day, long-term volatility, and average turnover 
for the firms in investment project announcements.  
The final dataset is constructed by merging the blockholder dataset, Compustat dataset, 
CRSP dataset onto the news dataset. Because the blockholder dataset didn’t have GVKEY or 
PERMNO code for firm identification, I manually built a corresponding table that maps each 
firm in the news dataset to their PERMNO, and then to their GVKEY using the Compustat 
CRSP merged dataset. The final merged dataset with complete balance sheet and stock return 
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information has 138 observations, because 70 out of the 208 data entries in the original news 
dataset don’t have PERMNOs.  
 
 
Fig. 1. Announcement of Investment projects over time.  
This figure plots the number of investment projects and their total value announced at a given quarter 
over the 1997-2002 period.   
 
Both the value and the number of investment project announced peaked around the fourth 
quarter in 2000, and gradually declined thereafter. This matches with time schedule of the 
“dotcom bubble” in the early 2000s, as S&P 500 index peaked from March 2000 to October 
2000, and the stock prices gradually declined until late 2002. Since many of these investment 
projects are funded with new issues of equity, managers might have taken advantage of the 
soaring stock prices, and announce more investment projects before the bubble burst.  It is 
possible that the blockholders’ interpretation of the firm value and investment projects changed 
during the different phases of the bubble, and the blockholders could have adjusted their 
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block size and total block size of both firms in my blockholder dataset and the original Cronqvist 
and Fahlenbrach dataset did shrink dramatically from year 2000 to year 2001. However, due to 
data size limitations, the time-fixed effects are not discussed in this paper, but could be of 
interest for future research.  
 
Table 1: Block Size Characteristics 
This table is a summary statistic of ownership concentration for firms in the Blockholder Dataset, and the dataset I constructed. 
It recorded the number of firms with different block size characteristics in each year. The blockholder dataset was originally 
constructed Ownership concentration can be measured with the holding of the largest block holding or the gross ownership of 
all blockholders.  
  1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 
1996-
2001 
Max block size [0%]  8 6 8 11 4 4 41 
Max block size [0-15%] 13 10 15 17 12 9 76 
Max block size [15-25%] 4 6 1 3 3 0 17 
Max block size [25-50%] 0 2 0 0 0 1 3 
Max block size [50-100%] 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 
Average sample max block size  [1] 0.088 0.111 0.053 0.057 0.118 0.090 0.083 
Average BH Dataset max block size [2] 0.124 0.120 0.130 0.131 0.131 0.127 0.128 
Total block size [0%] 8 6 8 11 4 4 41 
Total block size [0-15%] 7 7 8 12 7 3 44 
Total block size [15-25%] 4 2 6 5 3 6 26 
Total block size [25-50%] 6 8 2 3 5 0 24 
Total block size [50-100%] 0 1 0 0 1 1 3 
Average sample total block size  [3] 0.141 0.179 0.100 0.098 0.196 0.149 0.140 
Average BH dataset total block size [4] 0.219 0.215 0.247 0.252 0.257 0.214 0.242 
Note: 
[1] Average sample max block size is the average holding of the largest blockholder in the dataset I 
constructed, with 138 observations.  
[2] Average BH Dataset max block size is the average holding of the largest blockholder in the Block 
Holder Data set that Henrik Cronqvist and Rüdiger Fahlenbrach constructed, with 20,977 observations 
over the time period 1996 – 2001. 
[3] Average sample total block size is the average total holding of all block holders in dataset I 
constructed.  
[4] Average BH dataset total block size is the average total holding of all block holders in BH dataset.  
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Fig. 2a. The leftward shift of max block size from year 2000 to year 2001 
 
Fig. 2b. The leftward shift of total block size from year 2000 to year 2001 
 
Fig. 2c. A Comparison between the sample max block size and the BH Dataset max block size 
 
Fig. 2d. A Comparison between the sample total block size and the BH Dataset total block size 
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 Putting aside the fact that block size did change over time, Fig. 2c and 2d shows that the 
average block sizes, both maximum and total, are smaller in all years in the sample than in the 
blockholder dataset. There are a few possible explanations. First, it could be a search word bias 
in the crawler program. Maybe the keywords being searched for favored certain industries like 
manufacturing, or services, and that’s why the searched results all clustered in those industries. If 
the block sizes were smaller on average in those industries, then having disproportionately high 
number of firms in those industries in the sample would bias the average sample block size down. 
Second, it could be that the firms in specific sectors have a stronger preference to make their 
investment projects public, perhaps because of strategic reasons, and again if blockholders 
happens to be less involved with those sectors, then the average block size of the sample would 
appear to be smaller than the population. However, cross-industry variations in block sizes are 
not big enough to support this argument (see figure 3)  
 
Fig. 3. Cross-sector variations in block sizes of firms in the sample dataset 
The top dash line represents the average total block size of firms in Cronqvist and Fahlenbrach’s 
blockholder dataset, 24.2%. The bottom dash line represents the average max block size of firms in 
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 Thirdly, it could be the case that firms with large block sizes tend not to announce their 
investment projects as often. If that is the case, then we would not be able to see much difference 
in Capital Expenditure and Research and Development expenses between firms of large block 
sizes and firms of small block sizes, because firms are required to report their total amount of 
investment, regardless whether they intend to disclose it or not.  However, we do observe some 
significant differences between firms of large block sizes and firms of small block sizes.  
 
 
Fig. 4. Relationship between long-term investment, proxied by CAPEX+R&D, and ownership 
concentration, proxied by the total percentage ownership of all block holders  
 
 The last possible explanation is that firms with high block holding simply invest less, and 
therefore announce fewer new projects. This would cause the projects being announced in the 
newspaper, and later captured by my crawler, to be predominantly small in block size. This 
statement, however, will greatly undermine the association between project value and firm value. 
I will discuss more implications of it – the more concentrated firms in ownership make 
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Table 2: Summary Statistics 
Table reports summary statistics of 138 investment projects announcement during 1997-2002. Information includes industry 
break-down, firm fundamentals and stock price movement around announcement day.  
 
1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 
1997-
2002 
Total Number of Events 25 24 24 31 20 14 138 
Number of Events in Each Sector:  
       Mining 1 1 0 0 0 1 3 
Construction 0 1 0 1 0 0 2 
Manufacturing 11 11 12 17 9 6 66 
Wholesale 0 0 0 1 0 1 2 
Retail 4 2 0 2 2 1 11 
Finance  0 1 0 0 0 0 1 
Service 4 3 2 6 4 3 22 
Transportation, Communications, 
Electric, Gas and Sanitary service 5 5 10 4 5 2 31 
Number of Firms [1] 23 21 19 23 16 13 87 
Mean Firm Beta 0.9969 0.9480 0.8029 0.8114 1.0387 0.7660 0.8956 
Mean Firm Market Cap ($ millions)  34,932.1   38,144.6   57,276.8   98,628.1   82,179.6   77,929.9   64,894.9  
Mean Firm Total Asset ($ millions)  13,320.4   13,583.6   19,977.6   26,213.6   21,951.7   24,181.3   19,773.0  
Mean Firm Current Asset ($ millions)  5,758.5   4,663.6   5,865.4   11,067.8   9,282.3   11,541.6   7,876.7  
Mean Firm CAPEX ($ millions)  1,214.9   1,248.2   1,848.1   1,738.7   1,267.8   1,555.7   1,490.7  
Mean Firm R&D ($ millions)  505.8   586.4   696.3   1,435.9   1,132.5   1,749.5   978.9  
Mean Investment Size ($ millions)  948.1   368.8   1,196.7   1,138.6   1,245.0   705.8   951.9  
Mean Investment Shock [3] 1.2306 1.7714 0.7247 1.3843 1.4170 0.5490 1.2291 
Mean Event Raw Return (at t = 0)  0.0025 0.0114 0.0006 0.0045 -0.0047 0.0011 0.0030 
Mean Event AR (at t = 0)  0.0022 0.0092 -0.0014 0.0061 -0.0053 0.0017 0.0025 
Mean CAR [-1,+1] 0.0035 0.0038 0.0077 0.0050 -0.0142 0.0111 0.0028 
Mean CAR [-11,-2]  -0.0095 0.0062 0.0029 0.0067 -0.0014 -0.0046 0.0007 
Mean CAR [+2,+11] -0.0235 0.0043 -0.0033 0.0084 -0.0243 0.0321 -0.0024 
Note:  
[1] Number of firms does not equal to number of events because the same firms could have announced 
multiple projects in a quarter.  
[2] Mean CAR [-1,1] is the mean cumulative abnormal return from day -1 to +1, with day 0 being the 
project announcement day, or the first trading day after the announcement day; Mean CAR [-11,-2] is the 
mean cumulative abnormal return from day -11 to -2, capturing pre-announcement drifts; Mean CAR 
[+2,+11] is the mean cumulative abnormal return from day +2 to +11, capturing post-announcement 
drifts. 
[3] Investment shock is calculated by dividing the value of the project announced to the sum of CAPEX 
and R&D of the previous fiscal year.  
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 Nearly all investment projects announced were in the manufacturing, retail, service and 
transportation, communications, electric, gas and sanitary service industries, and there is almost 
no investment news in mining, construction, wholesale or finance industry. One possible 
explanation is that those industries were in recession during 1997-2002, and invest less, or 
alternatively, my crawler program could have favored certain industries, but failed to capture the 
news in the other industries, such as mining and construction. However, regardless of its cause, 
industry heterogeneity problem will be addressed by introducing industry specific dummy 
variables in all of my regressions.  
 The average betas of firms in sample fluctuated between 0.7660 and 1.0387 during the 
six-year period, with 2001 being the only year that beta was larger than 1. Beta measures the 
amount of systematic risk a company carries, and 1996-2002 was the special time period that the 
stock movements of high-technology firms decided the trend of the overall market. Near all 
high-tech firms had betas larger than 1 and non-tech firms had betas smaller than 1. The average 
firm betas in the sample were smaller than 1 in most years because the majority of the firms in 
those years were not high technology firms. In other words, it was again the cross-industry 
variation in betas during this time period that caused the firm betas to be smaller than 1.  
 Both average firm market capitalization and total asset peaked in year 2000, consistent 
with bubble timeline. Mean firm capital expenditure, research and development, and investment 
shock, all three measuring the firms’ investing activities, soared between 1999-2001, matching 
with our interpretation that managers would take advantage of high firm valuations by 
announcing more investment projects that were financed by issuance of new equities.  
 Average event raw return, which measures the stock’s raw return on the event day, is 
consistently positive, with the exception of year 2001. On average, stock prices increased about 
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0.3% on the investment news days during 1997-2002. When adjusted for market returns their 
systematic risks, the abnormal return still averaged about 0.25%, way higher than the risk-free 
interest rate, indicating that the announcement of news projects were indeed good news, or 
equivalently, the net present value of the projects were on average positive, if we believe that 
market valuations of firms do reflect the accurate present value of firm’s future cash flows. It 
remains unclear why the abnormal returns on the news day in 2001 were negative on average, 
perhaps because investors’ skepticism towards expanding production has grown during market 
recession.  
 The three-days cumulative abnormal return around the investment news day was 0.28%, 
slightly higher than the one-day abnormal return, because it has a higher chance of capturing the 
full announcement return. For example, when the investment news is released after the trading 
hours ends, then the investment shock will be reflected in the opening price of the next trading 
day, and when investment news has been first announced one day prior to the “investment news 
day” captured by my crawler, then the stock movement occurs one day prior to my “investment 
news day”. Therefore, for better capturing the full stock price movement of the news, I will use 
the three-days cumulative abnormal return, instead of the one-day abnormal return in my 
regressions.  
  The 10-day pre-announcement abnormal return averaged about 7 basis points and 10-day 
post-announcement abnormal return -24 basis points during 1997-2002. However, they are a lot 
noisier than the abnormal return around the announcement day. Section III discusses whether 
there is a relationship between firms’ block size and the size of the pre-announcement drift.  
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III Ownership Concentration and the Timing of Market Responses 
 
 Amihud and Li (2006) argued in their paper that there has been a decline in the 
cumulative abnormal return on the announcement of dividend increases and a rise in the 
cumulative abnormal return on the announcement of dividend decreases since the late1970s. 
They claimed that the reason for the declining information content of dividend announcements 
are the increased stockholdings by institutional investors, because “if institutional investors trade 
on their information about the firm’s value [prior to the announcements], then by the time that a 
dividend increase is announced, part of this information is already incorporated in the stock price 
and there is less additional information conveyed by the dividend increase announcement” 
(Amihud and Li 638).  
 I argue that similar to dividend announcements, blockholders would also trade on 
information about investment projects prior to their announcements. Even though not all 
blockholders are institutional investors, and might not be as professional, but as their holding of 
a company increases, they have more incentive to either trade on private information, or carry 
out more costly researches about the firm, or in other words, blockholders are better at predicting 
the announcement of investment projects. Therefore, I hypothesize that the pre-announcement 
drift is positively correlated with block size, causing the stock price movement on the event day 
to be much smaller. Post-announcement drift should be zero, regardless of block sizes. The 
mathematical and visual representations of my hypothesis is detailed below: 
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Fig. 5. Hypothesized Relationship between block size and the size of pre-announcement drift and 
event return   
 𝐶𝐴𝑅 −11,−2 = 𝜷𝒐 +   𝜷𝟏𝐵𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑘  𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒 +   𝜷𝟐𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡  𝑆ℎ𝑜𝑐𝑘 + 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠                    ⋯⋯⋯                              1  𝐶𝐴𝑅 −1,+1 = 𝜷𝒐! +   𝜷𝟏!𝐵𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑘  𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒 +   𝜷𝟐!𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡  𝑆ℎ𝑜𝑐𝑘 + 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠                  ⋯⋯⋯                              2  𝐶𝐴𝑅 +2,+11 = 𝜷𝒐!! +   𝜷𝟏!!𝐵𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑘  𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒 +   𝜷𝟐!!𝐼𝑛𝑣𝑒𝑠𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡  𝑆ℎ𝑜𝑐𝑘 + 𝑐𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙𝑠        ⋯⋯⋯                            3  
Equation 1 regresses the pre-announcement cumulative abnormal return on block size, 
and I hypothesize 𝜷𝟏 to be positive, because as block size of a company increases, the 
blockholder will be more inclined to trade prior to the announcement of investment projects. 
Equation 2 regresses the cumulative abnormal return during the 3-day event window on block 
size, and I hypothesize 𝜷𝟏! to be negative, because when the block size is big, most of 
information regarding the announcement of the investment project has already been incorporated 
into stock prices prior to the investment announcement, thereby dampening the announcement 
shock when the news goes public. Equation 3 regresses the post-announcement cumulative 





Large Block Size 	   	   
Small Block Size 
+1 -1 
	   21	  
from zero, because post-announcement drift will be merely a random walk of stock prices around 
zero, regardless of its block size and size of the investment announced. 𝜷𝟐 and 𝜷𝟐! should be 
positive, as on average, the higher investment amount, higher the expected NPV of the project, 
and higher the return around the announcement day.  
Controls for this model includes: industry dummies, current ratio2, long-term volatility of 
the stock3, size4 of the firm, and the average turnover5 of the stock. Industry-specific dummy 
variables are included based on the reasons argued in Section I:  block size seems to vary across 
different industries, and investors might value investment projects from different industries 
differently, and an omitted variable problem might occur without this control. I would suggest 
that the coefficient on mining to be negative using wholesale as the omitted dummy, because the 
mining industry has long been in a decline, and investors were likely to be more skeptical about 
new mining projects.   
Current ratio measures how much cash or cash equivalent a firm has, and will have in the 
near future. I argue that it also measures the probability of a firm investing in new projects, as 
it’s way more likely for a firm to plan new investments when it has more cash on hands, and less 
likely when its short-term debt obligation is high. Therefore, I hypothesize that the coefficient on 
current ratio to be negative. It also remains unclear whether a highly concentrated firm in 
ownership would favor having plenty of cash on hand or not, and therefore, it is necessary to 
keep current ratio in the regression to avoid the omitted variable bias.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 Current ratio is defined as   !"##$%&  !""#$!!"##$%&  !"#$"%"&'!"#$%  !""#$ .  
3 Long-term volatility is defined as the standard deviation of the firm’s abnormal return over the period [-520, -20].  
4 Size is defined as the natural logarithm of the market capitalization of the firm at t = -20.  
5 Average turnover of the stock is defined as average of   !"#$%&'  !"#$%&!"#$%  !!!"#$  !"#$#%&'(&) over the period [-520, -20].  
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Long-term volatility measures the average volatility of the stock during the 500-day 
estimation window [-520, -20]. High volatility indicates high idiosyncratic risks. It is thus less of 
a shock when the investment project is announced for those high long-term volatility firms. 
Therefore, I hypothesize the coefficient on long-term volatility to be negative. Block size might 
also be correlated with volatility, as block holders might prefer less volatile stocks.  
Size of the company is also an important control variable, because stock prices are more 
efficient for the larger companies. Analysts will perform more fundamental analysis on the larger 
firms, and it is quicker for information to be disseminated in the market. In other words, it is hard 
for a large company to keep its secrets. I hypothesize that the coefficient on sizen is negative, as 
part of the stock price movement, initiated by the investment news, is already predicted by the 
fundamental analysts, who only focus on the larger firms. Block size is also negatively correlated 
with the size of the company, because it is harder to accumulate large block holding when the 
size of the company is large.  
Average turnover measures the liquidity of the stock over the 500-day estimation period 
([-520, -20]). Turnover is also a measurement of information symmetry. If information is 
perfectly symmetric, then there will be no trading occurring at all, and ask and bid price for a 
stock will simply adjust themselves without any trading happening. It is way more likely for 
trading to occur when the buyer and seller have asymmetric information about the value of its 
underlining asset. Having a high average turnover then indicates that someone frequently trades 
on either their private information, or different interpretations of the public information. I 
hypothesize that average turnover is positively correlated with pre-announcement cumulative 
abnormal return, and negatively correlated with the cumulative abnormal return on the 
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announcement day. Block size is endogenous to stock liquidity in a model proposed by Edmans 
(2009). Therefore, not including average turnover could also result in an omitted variable bias.  
 
Fig. 6. Cumulative Abnormal Return of low and high block holding firms over time 
This figure describes how stock prices react to the announcement of investment projects, from 11days 
prior to the announcement to 11days after the announcement. High block holding refers to firms with the 
largest block holder holding more than 8.34% of the firm, and low block holding refers to firms with the 
largest block holder holding less than 8.34% of the firm. High and low block holding each constitutes 
50% of firms in the dataset. Detailed regression result with controls is presented in Table 3.  
Figure 6 shows that the pre-announcement drift for firms of high block holding is larger 
than the drift of low block holding firms. In fact, a positive stock price movement is observed 
even from day -10 for the high block holding firms, whereas the drift occurs much later for the 
low block holding firms at around day -4. This does match with my hypothesis that block size is 
positively correlated with pre-announcement drift. The market response to investment news 
occurs earlier for firms of high block size, and later for firms of low block size. However, it is 
hard to tell from the graph whether the event return (CAR [-1, +1]) is higher for low block 
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Table 3: Ownership Concentration and the Timing of Market Responses 
OLS regressions of pre-announcement ([-11,-2]), announcement ([-1,+1]), and post-announcement ([+2.+11]) cumulative 
abnormal returns on block size. Block Size is determined by the holding of the largest blockholder. 
Dependent Variable  CAR [-1,+1] CAR [-11,-2] CAR [+2,+11] 
 
(1) (2) (3) 
Investment Shock [1] -0.00319*** 0.00104 0.00199 
 
(0.00093) (0.00248) (0.00189) 
Block Size 0.0334 0.0382 0.0162 
 
(0.02750) (0.09130) (0.06530) 
SERVICES -0.00979 0.00421 -0.0878*** 
 
(0.01220) (0.03510) (0.02540) 
FINANCE -0.0284** 0.00234 -0.0471* 
 
(0.01320) (0.02780) (0.02520) 
WHOLESALE omitted omitted omitted 
    RETAIL -0.0262 0.0291 -0.0511 
 
(0.01810) (0.03900) (0.03360) 
TCEGS -0.0237* 0.0419 -0.0408 
 
(0.01390) (0.02960) (0.02650) 
MANUFACTURING -0.00566 0.0257 -0.0364 
 
(0.00959) (0.02660) (0.02310) 
CONSTRUCTION -0.021 0.0194 -0.0886** 
 
(0.01310) (0.05200) (0.03780) 
MINING -0.0372** 0.012 -0.0323 
 
(0.01480) (0.03260) (0.02660) 
Current Ratio [2] -0.026 0.0773* 0.021 
 
(0.02670) (0.04550) (0.05390) 
Long-term Vol. [3] 0.358 -1.195 -0.843 
 (0.66600) (1.13100) (0.72500) 
Sizen [4] -0.000254 -0.000834 -0.000253 
 (0.00253) (0.00352) (0.00459) 
Avg. Turnover [5] 0.297 -0.112 0.781 
 
(1.23200) (2.15900) (2.47800) 
Constant 0.0587 0.00418 0.0143 
 (0.0779) (0.0612) (0.0433) 
Observations 138 138 138 
R-squared 0.114 0.045 0.088 
Robust Standard errors clustered by month of the event date in parentheses. 
 *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
  Notes:  
[1] Investment shock is value of the investment project announced divided by the sum of CAPEX and R&D of the firm in the 
previous fiscal year. 
[2] Current Ratio is (current asset-current liability)/total asset 
[3] Long-term Vol. is the standard deviation of the firm’s abnormal return over the period [-520,-20] 
[4] Sizen is the natural logarithm of the market capitalization of the firm at t = -20  
[5] Avg. Turnover is the average turnover of the stock over the period [-520,-20] 
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The most striking result from the regression is the negative 𝜷𝟐!. Investment shock and 
cumulative abnormal return around investment news day is negatively correlated with each other. 
There are several possible explanations for this somehow confounding finding. First, it could 
merely be a timing issue. Information about the new projects announced could have gotten to the 
market earlier when the investment shock was large. Therefore, the pre-announcement CAR for 
the larger investment shock projects should have been higher than the CAR for the smaller 
investment shock projects, and the overall CAR for the project announcement (pre-
announcement drift + CAR around investment project) should be positively correlated with 
investment shock, as I originally hypothesized. Indeed, the coefficient for Investment Shock is 
positive when we change the dependent variable from CAR [-1, +1] to CAR [-11, -2] (see Table 
3, Column 2).  
The second hypothesis is that the expected NPV of the project is actually higher when 
size of the project is small. It is possible that the internal rate of return is negatively correlated 
with the initial amount of investment either because of the higher discounting rate for larger and 
therefore riskier projects, or because of the scarcity of large and profitable investment projects. 
Alternatively, the investors might be more skeptical about the intentions of the management 
when a large investment project is announced. This explanation goes back to the agency problem 
noticed by Jensen and Meckling (1976), and is also the explanation that will be discussed in 
detail in Section IV.   
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The coefficient on block size 𝜷𝟏 is indeed positive, matching with my hypothesis that 
pre-announcement drift is higher for the more concentrated firms. On average, if a firm’s block 
ownership is increased from 0% to 50%, the cumulative abnormal return prior to the 
announcement of investment projects is expected to increase by 1.91%, although the coefficient 
is not statistically difference from zero. 𝜷𝟏! is however positive as well, indicating that block 
size is in fact positively correlated with return on around event day, contradictory to my 
hypothesis. If a firm’s block ownership is increased from 0% to 50%, the cumulative abnormal 
return prior to the announcement of investment projects is expected to increase by 1.67%.  
The unexpected positive 𝜷𝟏! in the regression rings an alarm to my original model set-up. 
I unintentionally assumed that investment news is content wise the same for large and small 
block size firms. In other words, I assumed the full stock price movements for both large and 
small block size firms are the same, when controlling for other firm characteristics. The only 
difference between concentrated and dispersed firms in ownership is the timing the price 
movement when an investment project is announced. My results however show that block size is 
positively correlated with cumulative abnormal return, during all three phases: pre-
announcement, around announcement, and post-announcement. This is a clear indication that 
investors perceive investment projects announced by low block holding and high block holding 
firms very differently. A more careful empirical framework (perhaps using the percentage of the 
full price movement occurred in each phase, instead of using the absolute price movements) 
needs to be designed to formally study the timing of stock price movements in the advent of 
investment project announcements. Just looking at figure 6, however, there is some evidence 
showing that the timing of stock price movement is indeed different between high block holding 
and low block holding firms – more than 60% of the stock price movement for large block 
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holding firms occurred in the pre-announcement period, but all of the surges in stock price 
occurred during the 3-day announcement event window for low block holding firms. Therefore, I 
argue that when studying the content information regarding investment news, we need to include 
the CARs in the pre-announcement period as well because a substantial proportion of the stock 
price movement occurred during the pre-announcement period, especially for the concentrated 
ownership firms.  
 The coefficient on current ratio is one of the few statistically significant coefficients. It is 
however, positive, contrary to what I predicted. I argue that this is also a problem caused by 
people’s different perception in the quality of the projects. Even though firms with high current 
ratios are more likely to announcement investment projects, and the news will carry less 
information when an investment project is announced. However, it is also more likely for a firm 
to finance the project with its existing cash, instead of the issuance of new equities, and investors 
generally speaking give more credibility to projects financed with cash. Therefore, CARs are 
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IV Ownership Concentration and Project Value  
 According to Berle and Means (1932) and Jenson and Meckling (1976), firm value 
should be positively correlated with ownership concentration. When shareholders are dispersed, 
it is hard for them to act as outside monitors and enforce profit-maximization; on the contrary, 
managers could take advantage of corporate resources and maximize their own utility, instead of 
the shareholders’. As a firm’s ownership becomes more concentrated, the block owners of the 
firm can either act as effective outside monitors of the firm, or make active contributions to the 
day-to-day activities of the firm. In this way, the interests of the shareholders and the interests of 
the management are better aligned with each other. Based on the same logic, I argue that project 
value should be positively correlated with ownership concentration, because the project’s quality 
is higher with the presence of blockholders who serve as outside monitors.   
 
 Basic Regression Model:  
𝐶𝐴𝑅   −11,+1 ! =   𝜶+   𝜷  ×  𝑏𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑘  𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒! + 𝝐𝒊 
 Regression results with robust Standard errors clustered by month of the event date:  
 𝐶𝐴𝑅   −11,+1 =   −𝟎.𝟎𝟎𝟏𝟒𝟐+   𝟎.𝟎𝟓𝟗𝟏  ×  𝑏𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑘  𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒!                                                                                                                                               (0.0108)                (.0745)  
                                 R-squared = 0.0035   N = 57  
 
 The regression result indicates that block size is indeed positively correlated with 
cumulative abnormal return (the reason why I use CAR [-11, +1] to capture the full price 
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movement is detailed in Section III). When block size6 is zero, the average cumulative abnormal 
return over the full investment news period is -0.1%. However, every percentage point in block 
size will increase event return by 0.06%. Since shareholders need to hold at least 5% to be 
classified as blockholders, having a blockholder in a firm will turn the event return from negative 
to positive.  
 Demsetz (1983) and Fama and Jensen (1983), however, argued that firm value should be 
negatively correlated with managerial ownership for some range of high ownership stakes. This 
is because as the managerial ownership increases, so does his voting power, and eventually the 
manager will gain enough voting power to guarantee his employment at attractive salaries.7 This 
is the so-called “entrenchment effect” of managerial stockholding. Ownership concentration, 
when proxied by maximum block size, or the percentage ownership of the largest blockholder, 
should be positively correlated with managerial ownership, because the chances of a shareholder 
holding managerial position increases with his ownership. Based on the “managerial 
entrenchment” hypothesis, firm value should be negatively correlated with max block size, at 
least in some range of high block holding.  
 Morck, Shleifer and Vishny (1988) explored the possibility of nonmonotomic 
relationship between managerial ownership and Tobin’s Q, because “theoretical arguments 
cannot unambiguously predict the relationship between management ownership and market 
valuation of the firm’s assets”. The “convergence-of-interest” hypothesis suggests that 
management ownership is always positively correlated with firm value; however, “managerial 
entrenchment” hypothesis suggested that management ownership is negatively correlated with 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  6	  Block	  size	  refers	  to	  max	  block	  size,	  or	  the	  holding	  of	  the	  largest	  blockholder	  7	  In fact, Weston (1979) noticed that no firm in which insiders owned more than 30% had ever been acquired in a hostile takeover. 
It is thus very hard for someone who owns more than 30% of a company to loose his management position. 	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firm value at some range of high management ownerships. Morck, Shleifer and Vishny (1988) 
found that Tobin’s Q first increases, then declines, and finally rises slightly as the management 
ownership increases. Their explanation for this saw-tooth pattern is that “convergence-of-
interest” dominates when managerial holding is low, but “management entrenchment” becomes 
prevalent as managerial holding increases until the management cannot be further entrenched. 
That is when the management has gained enough voting power that additional ownership will not 
make much difference.  
 Similar to the relationship Morck, Shleifer and Vishny found, I hypothesize that project 
value first increases, then declines, and finally rises as the block size of the firm increases. Initial 
increase in block size helps with aligning the interest of the management and shareholders. As 
block size increases further, the probability of the largest block holder getting involved with 
firm’s management increases, and “managerial entrenchment” follows. However, as the block 
size gets even larger, the block holder will almost certainly join the management, and his voting 
power also gets large enough that he can take advantage of corporate resources and deviate from 
maximizing the firm’s value without being removed from office. After that point, “convergence-
of-interest” dominates again, and additional block size won’t further entrench the blockholder.  
 Following Morck, Shleifer and Vishny’s procedure of finding the piecewise linear 
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Block_Size_0to5  = block size if block size < 0.05  
         = 0.05 if block size ≥ 0.05  
Block_Size_5to10 = 0 if block size ≤ 0.05  
                               = block size – 0.05 if 0.05 < block size  < 0.1 
          = 0.1 if block size ≥ 0.1  
              … 
 Block_Size_40to100  = 0 if block size < 0.4  
= block size – 0.4 if block size > 0.4  
For example, when block size is equal to 0.17, Block_Size_0to5 is defined to be 0.05, 
Block_Size_5to10 is defined to be 0.05, Block_Size_10to15 is defined to be 0.05, 
Block_Size_15to20 is defined to be 0.02.  
𝐶𝐴𝑅 −11,+1 = 𝜷𝒐 +   𝜷𝟏𝐵𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑘_𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒_0𝑡𝑜5 +   𝜷𝟐𝐼𝐵𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑘_𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒_5𝑡𝑜10 + 𝜷𝟑𝐼𝐵𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑘_𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒_10𝑡𝑜15+ 𝜷𝟒𝐼𝐵𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑘_𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒_15𝑡𝑜20 + 𝜷𝟓𝐼𝐵𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑘_𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒_20𝑡𝑜25 + 𝜷𝟔𝐼𝐵𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑘_𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒_25𝑡𝑜30+ 𝜷𝟕𝐼𝐵𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑘_𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒_30𝑡𝑜35 + 𝜷𝟖𝐼𝐵𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑘_𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒_35𝑡𝑜40 + 𝜷𝟗𝐼𝐵𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑘_𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒_40𝑡𝑜100 
 𝜷𝟏 =   0.133  𝜷𝟐 = 0.343  𝜷𝟑 =   −0.347  𝜷𝟒 =   −0.082  𝜷𝟓 =   −0.214   𝜷𝟔 =   −5.24  𝜷𝟕 = 13.88  𝜷𝟖 =   −11.45  𝜷𝟗 = 1.75 
  
Therefore, it is natural to group them into: 
𝑩𝒍𝒐𝒄𝒌_𝑺𝒊𝒛𝒆_𝟎𝒕𝒐𝟏𝟎 = 𝐵𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑘_𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒_0𝑡𝑜5 +   𝐵𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑘_𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒_5𝑡𝑜10 
𝑩𝒍𝒐𝒄𝒌_𝑺𝒊𝒛𝒆_𝟏𝟎𝒕𝒐𝟑𝟎 = 𝐵𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑘_𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒_10𝑡𝑜15 + 𝐵𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑘_𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒_15𝑡𝑜20 + 𝐵𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑘_𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒_20𝑡𝑜25 + 𝐵𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑘_𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒_25𝑡𝑜30 
𝑩𝒍𝒐𝒄𝒌_𝑺𝒊𝒛𝒆_𝟑𝟎𝒕𝒐𝟏𝟎𝟎 = 𝐵𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑘_𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒_30𝑡𝑜35 + 𝐵𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑘_𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒_35𝑡𝑜40 + 𝐵𝑙𝑜𝑐𝑘_𝑆𝑖𝑧𝑒_40𝑡𝑜100     
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Fig. 7. Relationship between Block Size and CAR [-11,+1]   
CAR [-11,+1] is the cumulative abnormal return from day -11 to +1 (day 0 is the investment project 
announcement day). Block Size is the percentage ownership of the largest block holder. Dashed lines 
represent (+-2 Standard Errors). Detailed Regression with control variables is presented in Table 4, 
column 3.  
 The graph shows that a piecewise linear relationship between block size and project value 
(CARs) do exist. When block size is between 0 and 10%, every percentage rise in block size will 
increase the full cumulative abnormal return of the investment project news by 0.21%; from 10% 
to 30%, each percentage rise in block size will decrease the full CAR of the investment project 
news by 0.22%; when block size is larger than 30%, each percent increase will increase the full 
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Table 4: Does the Market Interpret Investment Projects Differently Based 
on Ownership Concentration of the Firm? 
Piecewise Linear OLS regression of announcement ([-1,+1]), pre-announcement ([-11,-2]), and full ([-11,+1]) cumulative 
abnormal returns on block size, or stock ownership of the largest block holder.  
Dependent Variable CAR [-1,+1] CAR [-11,-2] CAR [-11,+1] 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Block_Size_0to10 [1] 0.053 0.149 0.202 
 (0.100) (0.260) (0.263) 
Block_Size_10to30 [2] 0.090 -0.181 -0.172 
 (0.083) (0.210) (0.200) 
Block_Size_30to100 [3] -0.109 0.541*** 0.431** 
 (0.0904) (0.199) (0.198) 
SERVICES 0.010 0.012 0.022 
 (0.030) (0.029) (0.039) 
FINANCE -0.001 0.021 0.020 
 (0.025) (0.024) (0.036) 
WHOLESALE omitted omitted omitted 
    
RETAIL 0.003 0.023 0.026 
 (0.031) (0.029) (0.044) 
TCEGS 0.000 0.040 0.040 
 (0.028) (0.026) (0.040) 
MANUFACTURING 0.023 0.022 0.045 
 (0.026) (0.016) (0.029) 
CONSTRUCTION 0.011 0.017 0.028 
 (0.025) (0.041) (0.048) 
MINING -0.013 0.018 0.005 
 (0.027) (0.023) (0.038) 
Current Ratio -0.034 0.073 0.045 
 
(0.029) (0.047) (0.055) 
Long-term Vol. 0.149 -1.201 -1.052 
 (0.589) (0.950) (1.057) 
Sizen 0.002 -0.002 0.001 
 (0.002) (0.005) (0.005) 
Avg. Turnover 0.739 -0.334 0.405 
 (0.045) (0.086) (0.094) 
    Observations 138 138 138 
R-squared 0.083 0.067 0.044 
Robust Standard errors clustered by month of the event date in parentheses. 
 *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Note:  
[1] Block_Size_0to10 is the holding of the largest block holder (block size) that is between 0 to 10 percent, and the value is set to 
0.1 if block size exceeds 10 percent.  
[2] Block_Size_10to30 is the holding of the largest block holder (block size) that is between 10 to 30 percent, and is set to zero if 
block size is less than 0.1, and 0.30 if block size exceeds 30 percent.  
[3] Block_Size_30to100 is the block holding of the largest block holder (block size) that exceeds 30 percent, and is set to zero if 
block size is less than 30 percent.  
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Adding control variables to the model doesn’t change the coefficients in front of 
Block_Size_0to10, Block_Size_10to30 or Block_Size_30to100 much. When block size is 
between 0 and 10%, every percentage rise in block size will increase the full CAR of the 
investment project news by 0.20%; from 10% to 30%, each percentage rise in block size will 
decrease the full CAR of the investment project news by 0.17%; when block size is larger than 
30%, each percent increase will increase the full CAR of the investment news by 0.43%. I check 
the robust of my model specification by changing the maximum block size to average block size, 
and similar pattern is observed. Detailed results can be found in Appendix B.  
If we go back to Table 3 column 1, the coefficient on Investment shock is significantly 
negative, meaning that the market applauded more to the smaller projects while responded 
negatively to the larger ones around the project announcement day. Besides the timing difference 
in market responses hypothesis I make in Section III, I argue that the negative correlation 
between investment shock and CAR around investment news is the consequence of the agency 
problem. When a firm has only a few block holders, investors are generally more dubious about 
large investment projects it announces; however, as block size increases, investor gets less 
dubious, and their expected “quality” of the investment increases as well. We observed a 
negative coefficient in front of investment shock, because on average, block sizes in these firms 
are not big enough to convince investors that managers have chosen the large project for profit-
maximizing purposes, not for their own private benefits.  
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Table 5: Does the Market Favor Large or Small Investment Projects? 
Does this Preference Change with Ownership Concentration of the Firm? 
OLS regression of announcement ([-1,+1]), pre-announcement ([-11,-2]), and full ([-11,+1]) cumulative abnormal returns 
on investment shock and interactions of investment shock and block size, or stock ownership of the largest block holder.  
Dependent Variable CAR [-1,+1] CAR [-11,-2] CAR [-11,+1] 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Investment Shock -0.00535*** 0.00841*** 0.003 
 (0.001) (0.002) (0.003) 
Block_Size_0to10  -0.020 0.300 0.280 
 (0.106) (0.288) (0.297) 
Block_Size_10to30 0.068 -0.216 -0.148 
 (0.100) (0.273) (0.293) 
Block_Size_30to100 -0.061 0.505 0.444 
 (0.243) (0.708) (0.762) 
Investment Shock x Block_Size_0to10  0.028 -0.111*** -0.0825** 
 (0.017) (0.032) (0.033) 
Investment Shock x Block_Size_10to25  0.023 -0.019 0.004 
 (0.036) (0.060) (0.062) 
Investment Shock x Block_Size_0to10  -0.004 -0.063 -0.068 
 (0.092) (0.284) (0.304) 
SERVICES -0.003 -0.033 -0.036 
 (0.020) (0.032) (0.035) 
FINANCE -0.0259* -0.013 -0.039 
 (0.015) (0.035) (0.038) 
WHOLESALE omitted omitted omitted 
    
RETAIL -0.019 -0.008 -0.027 
 (0.024) (0.040) (0.043) 
TCEGS -0.019 0.012 -0.007 
 (0.017) (0.034) (0.038) 
MANUFACTURING 0.000 -0.006 -0.007 
 (0.013) (0.029) (0.031) 
CONSTRUCTION -0.016 -0.012 -0.028 
 (0.014) (0.048) (0.051) 
MINING -0.0339* -0.013 -0.047 
 (0.017) (0.033) (0.037) 
Current Ratio -0.021 0.066 0.045 
 
(0.030) (0.050) (0.057) 
Long-term Vol. 0.181 -0.946 -0.765 
 (0.703) (1.332) (1.543) 
Sizen -0.001 0.002 0.001 
 (0.003) (0.005) (0.006) 
Avg. Turnover 0.511 -0.562 -0.050 
 (1.132) (2.006) (2.290) 
    Observations 138 138 138 
R-squared 0.138 0.108 0.06 
Robust Standard errors clustered by month of the event date in parentheses. 
 *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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 Column 1 in Table 5 shows that, indeed, the interaction between Investment shocks and 
block sizes is positive, meaning that the correlation between investment shock and CAR depends 
on the size of block. When block size is zero, the correlation between investment shock and CAR 
[-1, +1] is -0.00535. A 0.1 block size, will reduce that correlation coefficient to -0.00255, and the 
correlation actually becomes positive when block size get larger than 0.21. That is, when 
shareholding of the largest block holder exceeds 21%, the market will respond more positively as 
the investment shock gets bigger. However, it remains unclear why the interaction between 
Investment Shock and Block_Size_0to10 is negative when we look at the full CAR, instead of 
the 3-day CAR around the investment news. Again, I check the robust of my model specification 
by changing the maximum block size to average block size, and in fact, more robust results are 
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V Conclusion  
 In this paper, I use an event study framework to find a piecewise linear relationship 
between block size and project value, similar to the relationship Morck, Shleifer and Vishny 
(1988) found between managerial ownership and firm value. Project value first increases with 
block size when block size is between 0 to 0.1, then declines with block size when block size is 
between 0.1 and 0.3, and finally rises with block size again when block size exceeds 0.3. 
However, the relationship between project value and firm value is ambiguous, as a high-value 
firm could have invested in many low but still positive project value projects. In fact, I do find a 
negative relationship between the amount of investment and block size, both in the short and 
long run. This is suggestive that, the high block-holding firms invested in projects that are higher 
in quality, but may have rejected other investment projects that they shouldn’t have rejected, 
whose NPVs were lower but still positive.   
 I also find investment shock to be negatively correlated with the cumulative 
abnormal return around the investment news day, for which I offer two possible explanations. 
The first one concerns the timing of market responses. Information about the new projects 
announced could have gotten to the market earlier when the investment shock was large, thereby 
causing a larger pre-announcement drift and lower CAR when the project is actually announced. 
The second explanation concerns investors’ perception of large investment projects. Investors are 
	   38	  
generally more dubious about large investment projects it announces, when a firm has only a few 
blockholders; however, as block size increases, investors gains confidence on the expected 
quality of the investment. The negative correlation between investment shock and event CAR is 
observed, because on average, block sizes in the sample firms are not big enough to convince 
investors that managers have chosen the large project for profit-maximizing purposes. There is 
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Appendix A: The Web Crawler Program  
 
Created on Fri Jan 20 23:38:34 2017 
from selenium import webdriver 
from selenium.webdriver.common.keys import Keys 
from selenium.webdriver.support.ui import Select 
import time 
import openpyxl as op 
import re 
driver = webdriver.Chrome('C:\\Users\\xguo\\Desktop\\Crawler\\chromedriver') 





elem = driver.find_element_by_id('queryTermField_0') 
if elem.is_displayed(): 
    elem.clear() 
    elem.send_keys('billion')   
else: 
    time.sleep(1) 
    elem.clear() 
    elem.send_keys('billion') 
     
time.sleep(1) 
elem = driver.find_element_by_id('queryTermField_1') 
if elem.is_displayed(): 
    elem.clear() 
    elem.send_keys('million')  
else: 
    time.sleep(1) 
    elem.clear() 
    elem.send_keys('million') 
     
select = Select(driver.find_element_by_id('fieldsSelect_0')) 
select.select_by_value('ti')   
select = Select(driver.find_element_by_id('fieldsSelect_1')) 
select.select_by_value('ti')     
time.sleep(1) 
driver.find_element_by_id('addRowLink').click()  
elem = driver.find_element_by_id('queryTermField_2') 
if elem.is_displayed(): 
    elem.clear() 
    elem.send_keys('invest') 
else: 
    time.sleep(1) 
    elem.clear() 
    elem.send_keys('invest') 
select = Select(driver.find_element_by_id('fieldsSelect_2')) 
select.select_by_value('ti')     
select = Select(driver.find_element_by_id('select_multiDateRange')) 
select.select_by_value('RANGE')   
select = Select(driver.find_element_by_id('month2'))   
select.select_by_value('JANUARY')  
select = Select(driver.find_element_by_id('day2'))    
select.select_by_value('1')  
driver.find_element_by_id('year2').send_keys('2002')  
select = Select(driver.find_element_by_id('month2_0'))  
select.select_by_value('DECEMBER')  






select = Select(driver.find_element_by_id('itemsPerPage')) 
select.select_by_value('100') 
time.sleep(1) 
elem = driver.find_element_by_id('queryTermField') 
if elem.is_displayed(): 
    elem.clear() 
    elem.send_keys('IBM')   
else: 
    time.sleep(1) 
    elem.clear() 
    elem.send_keys('IBM') 
select = Select(driver.find_element_by_id('fieldsSelect')) 




wb = op.load_workbook('1.xlsx')  
ws = wb.get_sheet_by_name('Sheet1') 
wbres = op.load_workbook('result.xlsx')   
if 'res' in wbres.get_sheet_names(): 
    wsres = wbres.get_sheet_by_name('res') 
    wbres.remove_sheet(wsres) 
wbres.create_sheet('res') 
wsres = wbres.get_sheet_by_name('res') 
pattern = re.compile('<li class="resultItem ltr".*?<a id="citationDocTitleLink".*?title="(.*?)" class.*?<span class="titleAuthorETC small".*?<!-- 
Close:block:publicationBlock  -->(.*?)</span>.*?<!-- Close:block', re.S) 
i = 1 
for row in ws.iter_rows():    
    if 1 == i: 
        i = 0 
        continue 
    company_name = row[0].value 
    ticker = row[1].value 
try: 
        time.sleep(1) 
        elem = driver.find_element_by_id('searchTerm') 
        if elem.is_displayed(): 
            elem.clear() 
            elem.send_keys('ti(' + company_name + ') AND ti((billion OR million)) AND ti((spend OR invest OR propose OR announce OR plan)) 
AND ti((project OR research OR technology OR plant OR facility OR store OR factory OR assembly line OR expand OR development OR 
upgrade OR increasing customer demand OR pipeline OR equipment))') 
        else: 
            time.sleep(1) 
            elem.clear() 
            elem.send_keys('ti(' + company_name + ') AND ti((billion OR million)) AND ti((spend OR invest OR propose OR announce OR plan)) 
AND ti((project OR research OR technology OR plant OR facility OR store OR factory OR assembly line OR expand OR development OR 
upgrade OR increasing customer demand OR pipeline OR equipment))') 
        elem.send_keys(Keys.RETURN) 
        time.sleep(7) 
        content = driver.page_source 
        items = re.findall(pattern ,content) 
        print company_name, '---', len(items) 
        for item in items: 
            wsres.append([company_name, item[0], item[1]]) 
        wbres.save('result.xlsx') 
    except Exception, e: 
        error_log.write(company_name + ': ' + '\n') 
        continue 
except Exception: 
driver.get('http://search.proquest.com.ezproxy.bowdoin.edu/advanced:reset') 
         
        driver.find_element_by_id('addRowLink').click() #添加行 
        time.sleep(2) 
        elem = driver.find_element_by_id('queryTermField') 
        if elem.is_displayed(): 
            elem.send_keys(company_name)  # 入 IBM 
        else: 
            time.sleep(1) 
            elem.send_keys(company_name) 
        elem = driver.find_element_by_id('queryTermField_0') 
        if elem.is_displayed(): 
            elem.send_keys('billion')  
        else: 
            time.sleep(1) 
            elem.send_keys('billion') 
        elem = driver.find_element_by_id('queryTermFieldRight_0') 
        if elem.is_displayed(): 
            elem.send_keys('million')  
        else: 
            time.sleep(1) 
            elem.send_keys('million') 
             
        select = Select(driver.find_element_by_id('fieldsSelect')) 
        select.select_by_value('ti')   
        select = Select(driver.find_element_by_id('fieldsSelect_0')) 
        select.select_by_value('ti')     
         
        elem = driver.find_element_by_id('queryTermField_1') 
        if elem.is_displayed(): 
            elem.send_keys('invest') 
        else: 
            time.sleep(1) 
            elem.send_keys('invest') 
        select = Select(driver.find_element_by_id('fieldsSelect_1')) 
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        select.select_by_value('ti')     
         
         
        select = Select(driver.find_element_by_id('select_multiDateRange')) 
        select.select_by_value('RANGE')   
         
        select = Select(driver.find_element_by_id('month2'))   
        select.select_by_value('JANUARY')  
        select = Select(driver.find_element_by_id('day2'))    
        select.select_by_value('1')  
        driver.find_element_by_id('year2').send_keys('1996')  
         
        select = Select(driver.find_element_by_id('month2_0'))  
        select.select_by_value('DECEMBER')  
        select = Select(driver.find_element_by_id('day2_0')) 
        select.select_by_value('31')  
        driver.find_element_by_id('year2_0').send_keys('2001')  
        time.sleep(8) 
        driver.find_element_by_id('SourceType_Newspapers').click() 
        driver.find_element_by_id('SourceType_Wire_Feeds').click() 
         
        select = Select(driver.find_element_by_id('itemsPerPage')) 
        select.select_by_value('100') 
        driver.find_element_by_id('queryTermField').send_keys(Keys.RETURN) 
time.sleep(10) 
      
        content = driver.page_source 
        items = re.findall(pattern ,content) 
        print company_name, '---', len(items) 
        for item in items: 
            wsres.append([company_name, item[0], item[1]]) 
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Appendix B: Robustness Check for the Model Specified in Table 4 
Piecewise Linear OLS regression of announcement ([-1,+1]), pre-announcement ([-11,-2]), and full ([-11,+1]) cumulative 
abnormal returns on block size, or the average stock ownership of all blockholders 
Dependent Variable CAR [-1,+1] CAR [-11,-2] CAR [-11,+1] 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Block_Size_0to10 [1] 0.0507 0.170 0.220 
 
(0.0998) (0.277) (0.269) 
Block_Size_10to20 [2] 0.182 -0.996** -0.814 
 
(0.231) (0.438) (0.490) 
Block_Size_20to100 [3] -0.695 4.988*** 4.293*** 
 
(0.902) (1.416) (1.557) 
SERVICES 0.0124 0.0108 0.0232 
 
(0.0307) (0.0281) (0.0384) 
FINANCE 0.00857 -0.00686 0.00171 
 
(0.0251) (0.0143) (0.0268) 
WHOLESALE omitted omitted omitted 
    
RETAIL 0.00472 0.00472 0.0263 
 
(0.0318) (0.0318) (0.0448) 
TCEGS 0.00263 0.00263 0.0343 
 
(0.0287) (0.0287) (0.0398) 
MANUFACTURING 0.0247 0.0247 0.0435 
 
(0.0264) (0.0264) (0.0292) 
CONSTRUCTION 0.0157 0.0157 0.0196 
 
(0.0260) (0.0260) (0.0503) 
MINING -0.00979 -0.00979 0.00530 
 
(0.0284) (0.0284) (0.0362) 
Current Ratio -0.0285 -0.0285 0.0325 
 
(0.0280) (0.0280) (0.0578) 
Long-term Vol. 0.172 0.172 -1.238 
 
(0.600) (0.600) (1.029) 
Sizen 0.00199 0.00199 0.000803 
 
(0.00230) (0.00230) (0.00489) 
Avg. Turnover 0.656 0.656 0.750 
 
(1.025) (1.025) (1.968) 
    Observations 138 138 138 
R-squared 0.079 0.074 0.048 
Robust Standard errors clustered by month of the event date in parentheses. 
 *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
Note:  
[1] Block_Size_0to10 is the average holding of all blockholders (block size) that is between 0 to 10 percent, and the value is set 
to 0.1 if block size exceeds 10 percent.  
[2] Block_Size_10to20 is the average holding of all blockholders (block size) that is between 10 to 20 percent, and is set to zero 
if block size is less than 0.1, and 0.20 if block size exceeds 20 percent.  
[3] Block_Size_20to100 is the average holding of all blockholders (block size) that exceeds 20 percent, and is set to zero if block 
size is less than 20 percent.  
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Appendix C: Robustness Check for the Model Specified in Table 5 
OLS regression of announcement ([-1,+1]), pre-announcement ([-11,-2]), and full ([-11,+1]) cumulative abnormal returns 
on investment shock and interactions of investment shock and block size, the average holding of all blockholders.  
Dependent Variable CAR [-1,+1] CAR [-11,-2] CAR [-11,+1] 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Investment Shock -0.00515*** 0.00851*** 0.00337 
 (0.00118) (0.00258) (0.00288) 
Block_Size_0to10  0.00927 0.344 0.353 
 (0.112) (0.318) (0.316) 
Block_Size_10to20 -0.121 -0.932 -1.053 
 (0.356) (0.672) (0.710) 
Block_Size_20to100 3.304 -2.857 0.447 
 (2.968) (3.364) (4.448) 
Investment Shock x Block_Size_0to10  
0.0279* -0.123*** -0.0946** 
 (0.0161) (0.0352) (0.0378) 
Investment Shock x Block_Size_10to20  
0.303* -0.0906 0.212 
 (0.170) (0.248) (0.267) 
Investment Shock x Block_Size_20to100 
-2.410* 4.102*** 1.692 
 (1.390) (1.353) (1.872) 
SERVICES -0.00107 -0.0414 -0.0425 
 (0.0195) (0.0407) (0.0441) 
FINANCE -0.0183 -0.0451 -0.0634 
 (0.0142) (0.0409) (0.0424) 
WHOLESALE omitted omitted omitted 
    
RETAIL -0.0220 -0.0160 -0.0380 
 (0.0244) (0.0492) (0.0520) 
TCEGS -0.0170 -0.00471 -0.0217 
 (0.0160) (0.0403) (0.0430) 
MANUFACTURING 0.000263 -0.0179 -0.0177 
 (0.0123) (0.0384) (0.0390) 
CONSTRUCTION -0.0130 -0.0320 -0.0449 
 (0.0138) (0.0589) (0.0605) 
MINING -0.0343** -0.0216 -0.0559 
 (0.0167) (0.0404) (0.0435) 
Current Ratio -0.0226 0.0568 0.0343 
 
(0.0292) (0.0454) (0.0582) 
Long-term Vol. 0.0706 -1.189 -1.119 
 (0.636) (1.139) (1.331) 
Sizen -0.000148 0.00156 0.00141 
 (0.00295) (0.00482) (0.00581) 
Avg. Turnover 0.791 -0.296 0.496 
 (1.048) (1.737) (2.234) 
    Observations 138 138 138 
R-squared 0.152 0.121 0.069 
Robust Standard errors clustered by month of the event date in parentheses. 
 *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
